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The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001
dramatically crystallized the pervasive threat of global terrorism.'
In the wake of the carnage and destruction from the three
airplanes that crashed into the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, acts of terrorism are no longer viewed as contained,
selective, minor threats. Such acts now are seen as global,
omnipresent, and incredibly destructive. In the minds of the
public and statesmen alike, the danger of terrorism escalated from
a localized, low intensity conflict phenomenon to a pervasive
world-wide war, with military countermeasures to be wagedS 2
accordingly.
* Professor of International Law, Department of Government and Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Director, Institute of
International Law and Politics, Georgetown University; Ph.D. University of Virginia
(Foreign Affairs, 1977); M.A. Florida State University (Government, 1973); M.A. Florida
State University (International Relations, 1972); B.A. Florida State University
(International Relations/History, 1970).
1. Terrorism indeed is a global phenomenon, as several factors demonstrate. First,
terrorism is not restricted to any state, region or jurisdiction. The repercussions of
terrorism affect people beyond one area. Second, the increased mobility of terrorists to
cross borders, acquire resources in several states, and access advanced communications,
including the Internet, creates a global milieu. Third, victims of terrorist attacks are often
many nationalities, such as the passengers aboard an international air flight or workers in
the World Trade Center. Consequently, the task of detecting and apprehending terrorists
exceeds the capabilities of any state and truly requires an international effort.
2. On September 20, 2001, in an address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American people, President George W. Bush declared war on terrorism in general and al
Qaeda in particular. 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001). For
international legal implications, see Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The
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This Article accepts the long-established premise that a law-
enforcement approach, as opposed to the currently popular law-of-
armed-conflict approach, is the principal means for dealing with
global terrorism. Using military force governed by humanitarian
law to counter terrorist activities is but one facet of counter-
terrorism policy. It is vital that governments practice a law
enforcement approach as well.
Under this law enforcement approach, the strategic key to
combating transnational terrorist activities remains the
apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of persons who
perpetrate or conspire to commit such criminal offenses. To that
end, close international cooperation and collaboration is required,
as are the open diplomatic channels and feasible legal means to
accomplish those ends. While much cooperation to combat
terrorism has been accomplished through bilateral efforts3 and
regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and
Organization of American States (OAS),4 the chief forum for
coordinating multilateral responses to the world-wide terror threat
Case for Self Defense Under International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (2001).
On the legal distinctions and implications of terrorism as war vis-A-vis terrorism as a crime,
see Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, in 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457
(2001).
3. Bilateral cooperative efforts to apprehend and prosecute terrorists are conducted
primarily through general extradition treaties between states. Realizing the importance of
the extradition process, the Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders in 1990 completed the drafting of a "Model Treaty on
Extradition" to assist governments interested in negotiating bilateral agreements to
improve cooperation in preventing international crimes and promoting criminal justice.
UNITED NATIONS, EIGHTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF
CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, REPORT OF THE EIGHTH UNITED
NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28 (1990).
4. The EU and OAS have adopted special anti-terrorist conventions for their
memberships. E.g., Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90 (articles 1-7 discuss
extradition); Organization of American States, Convention to Prevent and Punish the
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that
are of International Significance, opened for signature Feb. 2, 1971, arts. 3, 5, 7, 8, 1438
U.N.T.S 195, 196-97 (providing extradition requirements). Other regional organizations
have also adopted special counter-terror instruments. See League of Arab States, Arab
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, available at http://www.al-
bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm (articles 5-8 concern extradition of offenders)
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003); Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on
Combating International Terrorism, July 1, 1999, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item
160, at 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/54/637 (2000) (articles 5-8 concern extradition).
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is the United Nations (UN).5 Preeminent among the U.N.'s
international legal contributions is the adoption and promotion of
twelve international instruments that codify and criminalize
certain terrorist acts as unlawful offences against the peace and
security of humankind.6  The possibility that states can extradite
criminal offenders provides a critical ingredient for implementing
law enforcement among parties to these international conventions.
This Article examines the international extradition process
that operates through these U.N. multilateral counter-terrorism
instruments. To set the appropriate legal context, Part II provides
a brief introduction to the general nature of terrorism, extradition,
and the customary bases of establishing jurisdiction necessary for
exercising the extradition process internationally. The thrust of
the analysis comes in Part III, which outlines the provisional
framework for extradition in these U.N. conventions and assesses
how each instrument contributes to international extradition law.
Part IV examines the extradition process in the emergent U.N.
convention that outlaws and seeks to suppress international
terrorism. A critical aspect of the analysis focuses on the
possibility that the political offense exception might be inserted
5. The United Nations is the principal source of international legal measures to
combat global terrorism. The General Assembly's adoption of its 1994 Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate Terrorism signaled the U.N.'s formal commitment to condemn and
suppress terrorist activities. G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg.,
Annex, U.N. Doc A!RES/49/60 (1994). In 1996, the General Assembly adopted its
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism.
which seeks to restrict granting asylum to possible terrorists, remove the political offenses
exception for persons who commit terrorist acts, and promote the extradition of offenders.
G. A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc
A/RES/51/210 (1996). Moreover, this resolution created an Ad Hoc Committee to
develop a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with terrorism. This
committee, in concert with the General Assembly's Sixth (Legal) Committee, is now
negotiating texts for a convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and a
comprehensive convention on the suppression of international terrorism. In addition, on
September 28, 2001, the Security Council created a special Counter-Terrorism Committee
in Resolution 1373. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council, in
Resolution 1373, unequivocally condemned the attacks of September 11 as threats to
international peace and security, thus legitimizing an international military response by
the United States and other countries in self-defense. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess. 4385th mtg.,
U.N. Doc., S/RES/1373 (2001). It must be said, however, that the principal U.N.
contribution to combating terrorism remains the series of international counter-terrorism
instruments adopted from 1963 to the end of 1999. See Report of the Policy Working
Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/57/273 (2002).
6. See infra notes 39-117.
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into this anti-terrorism convention. Special attention is given to
why this exception could debilitate the efficacy of implementing
the extradition process in the instrument. Finally, Part V
concludes by discussing the modern legal implications of
extradition for countering terrorist activities, and offering some
conclusions on the relevance of recent events for the international
extradition process in general.
II. TERRORISM AND THE EXTRADITION PROCESS
An act of terrorism is generally a political act. Terrorism is
meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to
create an atmosphere of fear, generally for a political or
ideological (whether secular or religious) purpose. Acts of
terrorism are more than mere criminal actions. Terrorist acts
entail a systematic tactic used to attain political or strategic ends.
They involve calculated political strategies of fear, coercion, and
warfare. More recently, terrorist activities have arguably become
convenient instruments of certain states' foreign policies against
other states.
The concept of terrorism defies precise definition. Because of
its highly subjective and politicized nature, an exact, universally-
agreed upon definition of terrorism remains elusive. In a sense,
the difficulties associated with defining terrorism recall Justice
Stewart's reflection on the nuances of defining obscenity-we
know it when we see it-but there is no generally established
definition.8 Consequently acts of terrorism are easier to identify
than to define in precise legal terms acceptable to most
governments.
A. The Origins of State Sponsored Terrorism
State-sponsored terrorism emerged during the 1970's as a
dangerous strain of transnational violence. State sponsorship is
distinguished from other categories of terrorism by the
premeditated use of state agents for clandestine transnational
activity that is instituted, supported or authorized by a legitimate
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey Levitt, Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?, 13 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
97 (1986) and Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and
Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1995); see infra note 122 for
the definition of an "offence" in the Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism.
8. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
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national government. Benefits derived from such a strategy are
clear. First, a sponsoring government is able to encourage and
effectively pursue an internationally unlawful policy of its own
choosing, while maintaining a cover of plausible denial. Second,
state sponsorship represents a low-cost, expedient means of
eliminating exiled dissidents, coercing or intimidating adversarial
governments, and destabilizing and embarrassing antagonistic
foreign leaders. Third, state sponsors of terrorism offer means of
exporting revolutionary ideology. Thus, as an extended weapon of
the state, terrorism has evolved as a pernicious, furtive tactic
aimed at committing highly sophisticated mayhem and murder of
innocent people and destruction of private property. Sponsoring
states often view terrorism as effective means for overcoming
threats to their national autonomy.' As a consequence, some
governments have refused to condemn state-sponsored terrorism
when it is avowedly used as an instrument against imperialism. °
This policy attitude has contributed to the inability to produce a
universally accepted legal definition of terrorism, as acts of
unlawful terrorism are characterized as lawful measures in wars of
national liberation."
Under international law, responsibility lies with the
governments of individual states to ensure that their citizens do no
9. In 2002, the United States Government officially listed seven designated state
sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan. U.S. Dep't
of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/
2001/html/10249.htm (May 21, 2002) (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
10. This was especially so during the 1960s and 1970s among peoples in Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East, which were engaged in struggles for independence against European
colonial powers. Today, a main focus of such anti-imperialist sentiments is the plight of
the Palestinians under Israeli occupation on the West Bank.
11. In 1972, the United States put before the General Assembly a Draft Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism. U.N.
GAOR, 27th Sess., 6th Comm., Agenda Item 92, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (1972).
Agreement on this convention proved elusive, however, on account of contending political
interpretations over the lawfulness of violent acts committed by "national liberation
organizations," as opposed to unlawful activities engaged in by "terrorist" organizations.
A General Assembly resolution ultimately was adopted in lieu of the convention, by a
vote of 76-35, with seventeen abstentions. It affirmed the inalienable right to self
determination of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes, and condemned the
"continuation of repressive and terrorist acts" by such regimes in denying self-
determination and independence to such peoples. G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII) U.N. GAOR,
27th Sess., 2114th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (1972).
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harm to foreign nationals or other states.12 If a government learns
of its citizens' intent to commit a wrong, or instigates the offense
itself, the state is culpable. Governments, however, are neither
responsible nor liable for each and every act conducted by their
nationals. Nevertheless, when a government discovers its territory
has become a staging ground for hostile acts against another state,
international law requires that it take measures to prevent such
acts. "  This duty under customary law is clearly established
through international arbitral decisions, 14 and was articulated in
1970 by the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States. 5
The politically sensitive, subjective nature of what constitutes
"terrorism" and how terrorists should be punished has fostered
reluctance among certain states to harmonize their national
criminal codes on such unlawful activities. Municipal laws tend to
concentrate on the intentions and targets of terrorists. Hence,
unlawful activity in one state may be regarded as lawful in another.
This conundrum has precluded some governments from asserting
jurisdiction over terrorist acts. The consequence throughout most
12. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session
[hereinafter ILC 53d Report], U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc.
A156110 (2001), available at http://www.un.orglaw/ilc/reports/2001/200lreport.htm (last
visited Sept. 21, 2003).
13. See Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 257 (1977).
14. See e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 ICJ 14, at 191 (June 27). This norm of non-intervention was reaffirmed
earlier. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act (Helsinki
Accord), 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975), reprinted in 141.L.M. 1292 (1975). In Principle
VI (Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs), the Act provides that the participating states
"will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the
internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating
State, regardless of their mutual relations." The succeeding paragraphs prohibit not only
armed intervention or threats thereof, but also "any other act of military, or of political,
economic or other coercion," including "subversive or other activities directed towards
the violent overthrow" of a state's government.
15. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 8082, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 50, U.N. Doc. A/8082
(1970). The declaration asserts that every State is obligated "to refrain from organizing or
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands.., for incursion into the
territory of another State." Each state must also "refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting, or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of
such acts ..... Id.
[Vol. 25:493
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of the last century was often the failure to prosecute. One strategy
for states in meeting this challenge is for governments to adopt and
implement special extradition procedures for accused criminal
offenders.
B. Extradition Defined
Extradition is the process by which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime under the laws of one state is arrested in
another state and returned to the former state for trial or
punishment. Although states have no general obligation in
international law to extradite persons, the practice has become
widespread and is nearly universal. Even so, the process of
international extradition has serious defects." Due to so many
unique legal systems throughout the world, no single set of rules is
available to govern the process of international extradition.
Consequently, the conditions upon which extradition may be
granted vary widely. Most states require that fugitives can only be
extradited from their territory pursuant to authorization by statute
or treaty. Virtually all extraditions take place pursuant to bilateral
extradition treaties or conventions, although certain excepted
conditions can complicate the process between states. 7
Extradition is vital for enforcing international legal rules and
compelling respect for law and order. Without the political
capability or legal means to extradite accused criminal offenders to
states where they can be investigated, prosecuted, convicted, and
appropriately punished, those persons will remain at large, the
beneficiaries of impunity. Thus, extradition becomes neither a
diplomatic game nor trivial activity in seeking to apprehend
international criminals. It is an international process that is
essential today for bringing international fugitives to justice in
states where their alleged criminal offenses were committed.
Extradition procedures thus provide a necessary conduit for
bringing to justice individuals accused of international criminal
16. For a critical view of the extradition process, see John G. Kester, Some Myths of
United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441 (1988).
17. For example, while the United States extradites its own nationals, many other
governments do not, among them in Europe France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium and
in Latin America, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama. International Law: The
Importance of Extradition: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources of the Comm. on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 14 (2000)
(testimony of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
2003] 499
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offenses, including of terrorist activities. A criminal who succeeds
in placing himself outside the territory of the state where he
committed the crime also places himself beyond the reach of the
law that he has violated. Through the formal process of
extradition, one government transfers the accused individual to the
custody of another government. This process is usually done by
treaty, reciprocity, or comity. Indeed, four centuries ago, Hugo
Grotius asserted that it was a state's duty either to extradite or
prosecute accused criminals found within its territories if a second
state requests extradition." That vital role is highlighted by key
provisions in contemporary legal instruments to suppress
international terrorist activities, as extradition is used to facilitate
the apprehension, prosecution, trial, and punishment of individuals
who commit acts of terrorism. Additionally, if vigorously exercised
and enforced, extradition may serve as a viable deterrent to the
commission of criminal terrorist acts.
Historical experience, however, demonstrates that a treaty
agreement providing for the extradition process between states,
while necessary, may not be sufficient. Under contemporary
international law, no universal rule obligates governments to
extradite, or even prosecute, alleged offenders who hide in their
territory. 9 Indeed, the international extradition process today
operates almost entirely through bilateral treaties, and certain
conditions such as the nationality of the offender, concern over the
fairness of a foreign trial, or the supposed political nature of the
offense can obstruct the extradition process. Moreover, the
international extradition system is neither comprehensive nor
complete. No state has extradition treaties with every other state.20
18. 2 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLi Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES 526-27 (James B. Scott
ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana Publications 1964)(1583-1645).
19. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 83 (2001); M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE, THE DUTY TO
EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at Xi (1995); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401
cmt. b (1987) [hereinafter Third Restatement].
20. The United States, for example, has extradition treaties with approximately 100
states, although today there are at least a total of 193 states in the international
community. See U.S. DEPT. STATE, A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements
of the United States in Force as of Janumary 1, 2000, pt 1 (Bilateral agreements) passim, at
http://www.state.gov/www/ global/legal-affairs/tifindex.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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Perhaps most problematic for extradition cases involving acts
of terrorism is the political offense exception. Many modern
extradition treaties specifically exempt political offenses from
extradition, since liberal and democratic governments developed a
strong antipathy toward the idea of surrendering dissidents into
the hands of a despotic government.2 ' There are, however, no
recognized criteria as to what constitutes a "political" offense, nor
is there a rule of international law prohibiting the extradition of
political offenders. As a result, the decision whether to extradite
rests on subjective criteria, as determined by the holding
government. Accordingly, the bilateral extradition system can
provide only partial remedies for bringing international terrorists
to justice. The consequence is that, while governments might
agree that terrorist acts rise to being criminal offenses against the
international community, strict multilateral enforcement through
extradition in prosecuting such acts may still be lacking.
Since 1970, the threat of various international terrorist
activities prompted the ad hoc negotiation of a series of special
multilateral agreements dealing with criminal activities, nearly all
of which contain specific extradition provisions. These instruments
contribute much to expanding the opportunities for governments
to extradite accused offenders to other states, even in the absence
of specific bilateral treaties. Preeminent among the concerns for
which multilateral agreements have been negotiated are the
international criminal offenses associated with terrorist acts.
The United Nations assumed the lead role as convener and
sponsor of the various diplomatic conferences that negotiated
these anti-terrorism instruments. The rationale for this U.N.
strategy is plainly evident. Terrorist activities challenge in many
ways the core principles and mandates of the organization.
Terrorist acts are intended to be assaults on the principles of law,
order, human rights and peaceful settlement of disputes on which
the world body was founded. In addition, the effectiveness of any
international legal regime depends on its implementation and
support by participant governments.
21. For overviews of the political offense exceptions, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 502-83 (3rd ed.
1996) and CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 264-70 (1992).
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The U.N. system must therefore strive to raise awareness of
the various threats posed by terrorism. To meet this goal, it
stipulated that certain terrorist acts rise to the level of
international crimes. Between 1963 and 1999 the United Nations
sponsored and promoted the promulgation of twelve law-making
instruments relating to international terror violence.22 Further, the
United Nations today is promoting the negotiation of two other
prominent international instruments, a convention to suppress acts
of nuclear terrorism and a comprehensive convention on the
suppression of international terrorism. In nearly all of these
instruments, extradition is assigned the central role in law
enforcement. For extradition of an accused terrorist to proceed,
however, the government of a state must establish lawful
jurisdiction over that offender.
C. Jurisdictional Authority
Jurisdiction is critical as a legal ingredient to the extradition
process. For extradition to occur legally, a state must establish
lawful jurisdiction over both the criminal offense and an accused
offender. International law sets limits on a state's jurisdiction to
apply its statutes extraterritorially. Traditionally, a state may not
prosecute a criminal seized beyond its borders unless it has both
lawful jurisdiction over the committed act and has gained
jurisdiction over his person. Similarly, for governments to exercise
extradition under international law, lawful jurisdiction must be
secured by those states over an offender. In effect, the jurisdiction
to prescribe must exist before the jurisdiction to adjudicate and
enforce.
Obtaining extraterritorial jurisdiction for extradition involves
a two-step process. First, it must be determined whether the
requesting state's domestic law covers the offensive act, i.e.,
whether there are grounds for exercising national jurisdiction.
Second, a sovereign state must ascertain whether it may proscribe
such conduct extraterritorially under international legal rules. For
this second criterion, governments can apply any of international
law's five theoretical constructs for exercising prescriptive
jurisdiction: (1) the territorial principle; (2) the nationality
principle; (3) the protective principle; (4) the passive personality
22. See the discussion infra, notes 39-100.
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principle; and (5) the universality principle. 23 To facilitate broader
enforcement opportunities, these jurisdictional constructs are
integrated, to a greater or lesser degree, into special provisions of
the 'twelve U.N. anti-terrorist conventions. Therefore, each merits
brief comment.
1. Territorial Principle
The territorial principle determines jurisdiction according to
the location of the crime and holds that a state may punish crimes
committed within its territory. A variant of this, the theory of
"floating" territoriality, recognizes the jurisdiction of a state for
criminal acts committed aboard its flag vessels and aircraft. This
notion assumes that all flag-bearing air and sea vessels are
detached pieces of a state's territory. Any harm to its vessels
constitutes an offense against the state itself. Thus, criminal
jurisdiction for terrorist acts committed against these vessels
anywhere in the world attaches to the flag state. Of the
jurisdictional principles for extradition, the territorial principle
remains the most widely accepted and most traditionally applied .
2. Nationality Principle
The generally accepted nationality principle allows a state to
prescribe laws that bind its nationals, regardless of the location of
either the national or the offense. The nationality principle
extends a state's jurisdiction to actions taken by its citizens outside
its territorial boundaries. The government is expected not only to
protect its citizens when they are abroad, but it may also punish its
citizens' criminal conduct, regardless of where it occurs.
23. See generally 2 CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 33-105 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational
Publishers Inc., 2d ed. 1999); Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and the Failure of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 177 (1997).
24. Third Restatement, supra note 19, § 402 (1). This theory is confirmed in the 1963
Tokyo Convention by its reaffirmation of the "law of the flag principle" that assigns the
state of registration competence to exercise jurisdiction over offense and acts committed
on board its aircraft. 1963 Tokyo Aircraft Convention, infra note 36, art. 3(1); see also
Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Extradition Over Extraterritorial Crime, 29 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1118-19, 1123 (1982).
25. Third Restatement, supra note 19, § 402(2).
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
3. Protective Principle
The protective principle concerns acts abroad that are
considered prejudicial to the state's security interests. Under the
protective principle, a state may exercise jurisdiction over certain
acts that take place outside its territory, when such acts threaten
the security, territorial integrity, or political independence of the
state. Moreover, the protective principle permits governments to
prosecute nationals of other states for their conduct outside the
offended state.26
4. Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle gives a state extraterritorial
jurisdiction over offenses committed against its nationals,
regardless of where the crime occurs. Jurisdiction is based on the
nationality of the victim. The passive personality principle has not
been widely used, mainly because it is controversial and often
conflicts with the territorial principle. Passive personality implies
that people carry the protection of their state's law with them
beyond the state's territorial jurisdiction.27 This assertion
challenges the fundamental premise of a state's sovereign
jurisdiction over its own territory, which would undercut the
fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty.
5. Universality Principle
The principle of universal jurisdiction recognizes that certain
acts are so heinous and widely condemned that any state may
prosecute an offender once it obtains custody. Such crimes are of
universal interest to states and their perpetrators are considered to
be the enemies of all humanity. Since acts of terrorism are
universally recognized as international crimes, any government
may extend jurisdiction over terrorists under the universal
principle on the basis of hoste humani generis.28 A person accused
of such a crime can be arrested and tried by any state without
concern for the nationality of the accused or the location of the
offense, and without establishing any link between the accused
26. Third Restatement, supra note 19, § 402 cmt. f.
27. Id. cmt g.
28. Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM; US PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 142-
53 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
[Vol. 25:493
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offender and the prosecuting state. The only requirement is that
the crime qualifies as being universally condemned.29
D. Principles in Support of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Three of the above international law principles specifically
support the legal theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction needed to
extradite terrorist offenders. In order of practical legal priority,
these are the universality principle, the protective principle, and
the passive personality principle. First, the principle of universal
jurisdiction holds special standing, as it asserts that certain acts of
terrorism are crimes against humanity and as such, any state is
permitted to arrest, prosecute or extradite accused offenders on
behalf of the international community. The United Nations, by
codifying such terrorist acts as international offenses through these
prominent multilateral conventions, effectively rendered these
offenses international crimes and activated the application of the
universality principle for all state parties.
Second, the protective principle justifies a state's right to
punish offenders for crimes deemed harmful to the security or vital
interests of the state. This notion provides jurisdiction on the basis
of a perceived threat to national security, integrity, or sovereignty
by an extraterritorial offense.30 Since many terrorist activities are
intended to sway the foreign policy of a state, vital interests of that
state may be affected. Extending protective jurisdiction may
therefore be lawful, and thus exterritorial claims for extradition
acquire standing.
The third principle on which extradition may be premised-
passive personality-represents the most polemical basis on which
to assign state jurisdiction over an offender. This view permits
jurisdiction for extradition to be extended over persons who
victimize citizens of the particular state seeking jurisdiction.3
Though passive personality remains controversial, the Third
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
specifically recognizes this principle when applied to terrorist and
29. Third Restatement, supra note 19, § 404.; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal
Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice,
42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 106-108 (2001); see also Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity:
The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 159-60 (1996).
30. Third Restatement, supra note 19, § 402(3) cmt. f.
31. Id. § 402, cmt. g.
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other organized attacks against a state's citizen by reason of their
nationality.3 2 It seems reasonable that, if used in conjunction with
other jurisdictional principles, the passive personality principle can
bolster claims for extraterritorial jurisdiction which may be needed
to exercise the extradition process in U.N. counter-terrorism
conventions.
These five principles provide a framework for states to
establish jurisdiction over acts of international terrorism, and to
subsequently follow through by extraditing or prosecuting the
accused offenders. Few restrictions are imposed on the use of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Therefore, governments have the
opportunity to expand their law enforcement internationally to
exercise extradition proceedings. These legal principles provide
grounds for governments to extend their scope of jurisdiction over
terrorists abroad to secure their extradition. Important in this
regard is the fact that all of these jurisdictional principles are
incorporated to varying degrees into the U.N.'s counter-terrorism
instruments.
III. U.N. COUNTER-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS
Even before the United Nations was founded, the extradition
of persons accused of committing terrorist activities was formally
recognized as a means of international law enforcement. During
the League of Nations era, an unsuccessful Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism33 was drafted in 1937 for
international legal consideration (1937 Convention). Prompted
largely by the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, this
abortive instrument obligated parties to prevent and punish
offenders who committed "acts of terrorism., 34 The convention
went further as it imposed a duty on parties to criminalize certain
specific acts amounting to terrorist offenses. To that end, Article 2
mandated that:
32. As the Third Restatement opines, the passive personality principle "has not been
generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to
terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality,
or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other officials." Id.
33. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937, 19
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938) [hereinafter 1937 Convention].
34. Id. art. 1. Instructively for present legal considerations, "acts of terrorism" were
defined in the 1937 draft as "criminal acts directed against a State and intended or
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of
persons or the general public." Id. art. 1(2).
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Each of the High Contracting Parties shall, if this has not
already been done, make the following acts committed on his own
territory criminal offences if they are directed against another
High Contracting Party and if they constitute acts of terrorism
within the meaning of Article 1:
(1) Any willful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss
of liberty to:
(a) Heads of States, persons exercising the prerogatives of
the head of State, their hereditary or designated successors;
(b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons;
(c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public
positions when the act is directed against them in their
public capacity.
(2) Willful destruction of, or damage to, public property or
property devoted to a public purpose belonging to or subject to
the authority of another High Contracting Party.
(3) Any willful act calculated to endanger the lives of members
of the public.
(4) Any attempt to commit an offense falling within the
foregoing provisions of the present article.
(5) The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of
arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substances with a view
to the commission in any country whatsoever of an offence
falling within the present article.
The instrument also would make conspiracy, incitement,
willful participation and assistance given in the commission of such
criminal offenses illegal.36
The 1937 Convention explicitly included extradition as the
principal means for bringing alleged offenders to justice. The
instrument asserted that any of the offenses in Articles 2 and 3
shall be deemed as extradition crimes for extradition treaties that
are already in force or may be concluded between contracting
parties. Moreover, offenses committed within the territory of a
contracting party may be regarded as extraditable crimes,37 and
35. Id. art. 2.
36. Id. art. 3.
37. Id. art. 8.
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parties were required to prosecute nationals when national law
prevented their extradition. 38 This draft text contributed to the
contemporary law against terrorism. It represented the first
serious attempt to criminalize acts of terrorism. Moreover, its
language contributed to various principles and provisions that
were incorporated into subsequent U.N. counter-terrorism
conventions that today are part of modern international law.
International anxieties over global terrorism grew
sporadically. Certain events gave rise to harmful activities that
prompted the international community to take action to prohibit
those activities and punish the offenders. The forums for creating
and instituting these new international legal rules were special
organs and agencies within the U.N. system. Since 1960, four
specific issue-areas tended to dominate international concern over
global terrorism: crimes against the safety of international
aviation; crimes against the safety of individual persons; crimes
against the safety of maritime navigation; and crimes associated
with violent terrorist activities. As the need to deal with these
concerns arose, U.N. agencies became the organizers for
instigating legal action.
A. Crimes Against the Safety of International Aviation
The first U.N. effort to criminalize terrorist activities
internationally dealt with threats to the safety of international
aviation. During the 1960s, the international community became
seriously concerned over the unlawful seizure of aircraft flying
international routes. To suppress these dangerous activities, the
principal U.N. agency concerned with safe and secure global air
transportation, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), sponsored the promulgation of four prominent
international legal instruments.
1. The Tokyo Convention
First, in 1963, ICAO sponsored the negotiation of the Tokyo
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention).3 9 This instrument addresses
38. Id. art. 9.
39. Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter
Tokyo Convention]. On January 1, 2003, 173 states were parties to the Tokyo Convention.
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offenses committed on board aircraft, but is not specifically
directed against terrorist offenses.40 The prominent focus of this
Convention focuses on establishing jurisdiction over offenders.
Not only is an aircraft's state of registration competent to exercise
jurisdiction over offenses committed on board, but each
contracting state is obliged to take the measures necessary to
establish jurisdiction over the offenses as the state of registration.
The Convention does not eliminate existing or future jurisdiction
in states other than the state of registration. A contracting state,
which is not the state of registration, may interfere with an aircraft
in flight to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offense
committed on board in limited cases. For instance, it may do so if
(1) the offense was perpetrated in the territory of the state
asserting jurisdiction, (2) the offense was committed by or against
a national or permanent resident of that state, or (3) the offense
was against the security of that state.
The Tokyo Convention applies, irrespective of whether the
aircraft is engaged in international or domestic flight, in only two
situations: (1) if the location of the aircraft's take-off or landing is
situated outside the territory of the state of registration of the
aircraft; (2) if the offense is committed in the territory of a state
other than the state of registration of the aircraft.4' The main focus
of the convention aims to ensure that offenders cannot escape
punishment on account of the lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
convention provides in Articles 3 and 4 that legal jurisdiction exists
for the state of an aircraft's registration, as well as for the state in
whose territory the offense was committed. Even so, no specific
provision is made in the 1963 Tokyo Convention for the
extradition of offenders.
2. The Hague Convention
The watershed legal development for extraditing terrorist
skyjack offenders came in 1970 with the adoption of Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
. 40. The Tokyo Convention applies to "offences against penal law" and "acts which,
whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of
persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board." Id.
art. 1.
41. Id. art 4(2).
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(Hague Convention).42 This instrument specifically deals with
aircraft hijacking. By defining the act of unlawful seizure of
aircraft, contracting states were obliged to make an offense
punishable by severe penalties. As defined in the convention, an
offense occurs when
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form
of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or
attempts to perform any such act, or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to
perform any such act....
The Convention in Article 2 imposes a duty on states to
punish such offenses, and goes on to obligate contracting states to
enact measures for establishing jurisdiction over alleged
offenders. 44
The extradition process assumes a critical role within the 1970
Hague Convention. The convention contains a lengthy provision
on the extradition of alleged offenders in Article 8, which in full
stipulates that:
1. The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable
offence in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting
States. Contracting States undertake to include the offence as
an extraditable offence in every extradition treaty to be
concluded between them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another Contracting State with which it has no extradition
treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal
basis for extradition in respect of the offence. Extradition shall
be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offence as an
42. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971) [hereinafter
Hague Convention]. As of January 1, 2003, at least 175 states are parties to the Hague
instrument.
43. Id. art. 1.
44. Id. art. 4.
[Vol. 25:493
International Extradition and Global Terrorism
extraditable offence between themselves subject to the
conditions provided by the law of the requested state.
4. The offence shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition
between Contracting States, as if it has been committed not
only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories
of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in
accordance with Article VI, paragraph 1.45
This provision obligates parties to treat the offenses defined
in the Convention as extraditable offenses in present and future
extradition treaties. It permits a state party, which conditions
extradition of an offender on the existence of an extradition treaty,
to regard the Convention itself as the basis for extradition to a
state with which it has no extradition treaty. For parties which do
not insist on a treaty as the basis for extradition, it requires that
the offense defined in the convention be regarded as an
extraditable offense.
The Hague Convention, unlike the Tokyo Convention, puts
considerable emphasis on enforcement. Under the Hague
instrument, a state is obliged, whether or not it is the state of
registration, to take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offense in the case where the
alleged offender is present in its territory and is not extradited. If
no extradition treaty exists between the states concerned, and an
offender is in the territory of a contracting state, which refuses to
extradite that offender, then it must submit the case to its domestic
authorities for the purpose of prosecuting that offender under its
criminal law. This provision still leaves extradition subject to all
the other conditions imposed by a relevant extradition treaty or by
the extradition law of the requested state. These conditions might
include the political offense exception (which precludes
extradition where the crime for which it is requested is considered
to be a "political offense"), as well as the rule barring the
extradition of nationals.46
45. Id. art. 8.
46. Some efforts have been made to "depoliticalize" multilateral extradition
provisions. Among them are the Optional Protocol Regarding the Suppression of
Counterfeiting Currency, Apr. 20, 1929, 112 L.N.T.S. 395; the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9. 1948, art. 7, 78 U.N.T.S.
277; the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, art. 11, 1015 U.N.T.S 243; the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res.
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It is important to realize that Article 8 of the Hague
Convention has been used as the model extradition provision in
several later U.N. counter-terrorism conventions. Concurrently, if
a state's government decides not to extradite an accused offender,
then the government must prosecute the offender under the
Hague Convention. The key provision is Article 7, which provides
that:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purposes of prosecution. Those
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the
law of that State.47
The legal principle here is aut dedere autjudicare-the duty to
extradite or prosecute accused offenders.48 Subsequent U.N.
counter-terror agreements have mirrored the language of their
extradite-or-prosecute obligations according to Article 7 of the
Hague Convention. This prescription requires the state in which
an alleged offender is discovered either to extradite that person to
a state which is acknowledged to have jurisdiction over the offense
or "to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purposes
of prosecution." However, neither the Hague Convention, nor
any other U.N. counter-terrorism instrument, requires the state to
prosecute the alleged offender through judicial proceedings. All
that is required is a decision by the competent authorities on
whether to prosecute given the factual circumstances of the
situation. In essence, this language preserves for the alleged
offender the rights of due process, a fair trial, and guarantees the
concept of innocent until proven guilty. Presumably, an
investigation into the facts of the allegation against an accused
offender determines whether to proceed to the trial phase. If the
39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 5, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984); and the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, art. 1, Europ. T.S.
No. 90.
47. Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. 7.
48. The duty to extradite or prosecute stems from the Roman notion of aut dedere aut
judicare. The term dedere means to surrender or extradite, while judicare refers to the
need to adjudicate or prosecute. For use of this expression, see 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 953, 971 (R. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
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investigation produces sufficient evidence, the offender may be
prosecuted.
3. The Montreal Convention
During the late 1960s, the threat of terrorists destroying
international airliners became a serious concern to ICAO
members. Between 1967 and 1970, terrorists destroyed several
airplanes by placing bombs on board. To address the crimes of
aircraft sabotage, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Civil Aviation was
negotiated in 1971 (Montreal Convention).49  The Montreal
Convention defines a broad spectrum of unlawful acts against the
safety of civil aviation. The Convention contains detailed
provisions on jurisdiction, custody, prosecution and extradition of
an alleged offender similar to those in the Hague Convention. Like
the Tokyo and Hague Conventions, the Montreal Convention does
not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services.
Moreover, this instrument strives to establish universal jurisdiction
over the offender. 0
A person commits an offense under the Montreal Convention
if he "performs an act of violence against a person on board an
aircraft in flight" that might endanger the safety of the aircraft;
"destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an
aircraft" in flight; places a device on board an aircraft that is likely
to destroy or damage that aircraft; "destroys or damages air
navigation facilities or interferes with their operation"; or
49. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973)
[hereinafter Montreal Convention). By Jan. 1, 2003, 176 states had become parties to the
Montreal Convention.
50. In relevant part, Article 5 provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences in the following cases:
a. when the offence is committed in the territory of that State;
b. when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered
in that State;
c. when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its
territory with the alleged offender still on board;
d. when the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft leased
without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the
lessee has no such place of business, his permanent residence, in that State.
Id. art. 5(1). Taken as a whole, these conditions permit a very broad basis for the assertion
of jurisdiction over accused offenders.
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communicates false information that endangers the safety of an
aircraft in flight." The Montreal Convention obliges parties to
treat these offenses as extraditable. In so doing, the Convention
relies heavily on the language found in Article 8 of the 1970 Hague1 2
Convention. In that context, states parties are obligated to treat
the offenses defined in the Convention as extraditable offenses in
both current and subsequent extradition treaties. Further, a state
party, which conditions extradition on the existence of an
extradition treaty, may regard the convention itself as the lawful
basis for extraditing an accused offender to a state with which it
has no extradition treaty. For states which do not insist on a treaty
as the basis for extradition, the provision requires that the offense
defined in the Convention be considered as an extraditable
offense. Moreover, like the Hague Convention, Article 7 of the
Montreal Convention obligates a state party to "submit the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution" if an
offender is not extradited, while other provisions require that
parties cooperate with other governments in preventing and
punishing these offenses. 3 Once again, however, the instructed
obligation is to "submit the case" to its domestic authorities, not to
initiate prosecution through trial proceedings.
51. Id. art. 1.
52. Article 8 of the Montreal Convention provides:
1. The offences shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States
undertake to include the offences as extraditable offence in every extradition
treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence
of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State with
which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention
as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. Extradition shall be
subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences as extraditable offences
between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the
requested state.
4. Each of the offences shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition between
Contracting States, as if it has been committed not only in the place in which it
occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1(b), (c) and (d).
Id. art. 8.
53. Id. arts. 7, 10, 11, 13 and 21.
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4. The Montreal Convention Refined
In February 1988, ICAO sponsored the negotiation of a
Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Protocol),
supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The Protocol adds to
the definition of "offence" given in the Montreal Convention of
1971 by including unlawful and intentional acts of violence against
persons at an airport serving international civil aviation.5 Such
acts are offenses when they cause or are likely to cause serious
injury or death to persons, destroy or seriously damage airport or
aircraft facilities not in service, or disrupt the services of the
airport 6 The qualifying element of these offenses is the fact that
such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that
airport 7 These offenses are punishable by severe penalties, and
contracting states are obliged to establish jurisdiction over offenses
not only in the case where the offense was committed in their
territory but also where the alleged offender is present in their
territory and they opt against extradition to the state where the
offense took place.
B. Crimes Against the Safety of Individual Persons
In the early 1970s, the international community became
acutely concerned over threats that serious harm or injury might
be inflicted on diplomats and individual persons taken hostage by
groups of terrorists. A principal catalyst for this apprehension
came in March 1973, when U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel and
Charges d'Affaires George Curtis Moore, along with Belgian
diplomat Guy Eid, were kidnapped and murdered in Khartoum,
Sudan, by Palestinians terrorists. s This tragic event prompted the
54. Protocol for the suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, ICAD Doc. 9518, available at
http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism-conventionairports.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2003) (entered into force Aug. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Protocol]. In January 2003, 126 states
were parties to this Protocol.
55. Id. art. 1 bis. (a).
56. Id. art. 1 bis (a)(b).
57. Id. art. 1(b).
58. On March 1, 1973, "eight members of Black September, part of Arafat's Fatah
organization, stormed the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, [sic] took Noel, Moore, and others
hostage. A day later... Noel, Moore and Eid were machine-gunned to death .... See
Joseph Farah, New Evidence Arafat Killed U.S. Diplomats. Nixon Historian Finds CIA
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United States to introduce in the General Assembly the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons (Internationally Protected
Persons Convention), including Diplomatic Agents.59
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons
The Internationally Protected Persons Convention applies to
the crimes of direct involvement or complicity in the actual or
threatened murder, kidnapping, or attack on the person, official
premises, private accommodation, or transportation services of
diplomatic agents and other "internationally protected persons. ' 6
States are obligated to (1) establish their jurisdiction over the
offenses described; (2) make the offenses punishable by
appropriate penalties; (3) take alleged offenders into custody; (4)
prosecute or extradite alleged offenders; (5) cooperate in
preventive measures; and (6) exchange information and evidence
needed in related criminal proceedings. The offenses in the
convention are deemed extraditable between states under existing
extradition treaties, and under the convention itself.
Universal jurisdiction is essential to ensure the performance
of the two key provisions relating to extradition of offenders. As
with other U.N. counter-terrorism conventions, the Internationally
Protected Persons Convention mandates in Article 6 that a state
party which discovers an alleged offender in its territory, "shall, if
it does not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever
and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for
the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance
with the laws of that State. ' '61 Article 8 then enumerates several
Report on Fatah Link to 1973 Murders, at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/
article.asp?ARTICLEID=26856 (Mar. 18, 2002) (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
59. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force
Feb. 20, 1977) [hereinafter Internationally Protected Persons Convention]. In January
2003, there were 124 parties and 25 signatories to this convention.
60. Id. art. 2. "Internationally protected persons" are defined as Heads of State or
Government, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, State officials and representatives of
international organizations entitled to special protection in a foreign State, and their
families. Id. art. 1. The notion of an internationally protected person derives from Article
1 of the 1937 League of Nations Convention on Terrorism. See 1937 Convention, supra
note 33, art.1(1).
61. Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 59, art. 7.
[Vol. 25:493
2003] International Extradition and Global Terrorism 517
stipulations intended to simplify the requirements for extradition
among state parties regarding criminal offenses covered by the
convention. If these crimes are not listed as extraditable offenses
in existing extradition treaties, they are deemed as having been
included. If a state grants requests for extradition only on the basis
of a treaty, it is given the choice of treating the articles in the treaty
as a basis for extradition, while states not bound to such a
requirement are expected to recognize the Article 2 crimes as
extraditable offenses. In both instances, extradition would be
performed "subject to the procedural provisions and the other
conditions of the law of the requested State.,
6
1
Articles 7 and 8 of the Internationally Protected Persons
Convention closely resemble companion provisions in the 1970
Hague and 1971 Montreal Conventions. The state where an
alleged offender is found retains the option of either instituting
proceedings aimed at prosecution of that person or, assuming that
a request for extradition has been received, of complying with that
request. If no request for extradition is received, the requisite
proceedings for prosecution must proceed forward. If one or more
requests for extradition are received, but the decision is made not
to extradite the alleged offender, the holding government must
proceed to prosecute. The reasons for non-extradition are
irrelevant. A requested state can refuse extradition on various
grounds, including the nationality of the alleged offender, concern
over the prospects of receiving a fair trial, or concern over the
possibility of capital punishment. Additionally, a state can decide
that it prefers to institute proceedings itself. In any event, the
critical consideration is that if extradition is refused, the requested
state is obligated to institute prosecution proceedings against the
alleged offender. Nonetheless, the obligation is for the state to
institute proceedings against an accused offender. It is not duty-
bound to complete trial proceedings or to convict and punish the
offender.
2. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages
Hostage-taking became a serious international concern in the
immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. On
November 4, 1979, Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy
62. Id. art 8(3).
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complex in Teheran, Iran, and took more than one hundred
63
persons hostage, most of them American citizens. While all the
hostages were eventually released unharmed, the incident
prompted the United States to introduce in the United Nations the
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages in
December of 1979 (Hostages Convention). 64 This Convention
defines the peacetime taking of hostages as a separate
international crime. It declares the offense of hostage-taking to be
the following: direct involvement or complicity in the seizure or
detention of a person, and threatening to kill, injure, or detain a
hostage in order to compel a state, an international
intergovernmental organization, a person, or a group of persons to
do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition
for the release of the hostage.6 Each contracting party is required
to make this offense punishable by apjpropriate penalties and to
cooperate in preventing such offenses. Where hostages are held
in the territory of a state, that government is obligated to take all
measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the
hostages and secure their release. Each state is further obligated
to take such actions as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction
over the offense of taking of hostages.67
The Hostages Convention relies heavily on extradition for the
apprehension of suspected offenders. States are obligated to take
alleged offenders into custody, prosecute or extradite them, and
exchange information and evidence needed in related criminal
proceedings. Article 10, which mainly replicates language in the
1970 Hague Convention, 6s assigns extradition a salient role in the
enforcement process. The provision stipulates that the offenses in
63. The Iranian government refused to intervene, allowing 53 Americans to be held
hostage by the "students" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 440 days until they were
released on January 20, 1981. The United States also brought suit against Iran in the
International Court of Justice arguing that this act violated the diplomatic sanctity of the
U.S. embassy. See International Court of Justice Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran ) 1979 1.C.J. 3
(Dec. 15). The ICJ decided unanimously that Iran must redress the situation resulting
from the events on November 4, 1979. Id. at 124.
64. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force June 3, 1983) [hereinafter Hostages
Convention].
65. Id. art. 1.
66. Id. arts. 2 & 4.
67. Id. art. 5.
68. See Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. 8.
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the convention are deemed to be extraditable offenses between
states parties under existing and future extradition treaties, as well
as under the convention itself. The convention may also be used as
the legal basis for the extradition of alleged offenders, subject to
the law of the requested state. Finally, to facilitate the lawful
execution of the extradition process, offenses associated with
hostage-taking will be treated as if they occurred not only in the
territory of actual commission, but also in the territories of states
required to establish legal jurisdiction over an offender. In this
manner, the Hostages Convention directly applies the universality
and passive personality principles.
The Hostages Convention deviates from the pattern of U.N.
counter-terrorism treaties in a fundamental aspect. It prescribes a
duty for states to detain accused offenders pending prosecution or
extradition. The state in which an alleged offender is found is
obliged to "take appropriate measures, including detention,"
under its domestic law to ensure that prosecution or extradition
can be carried out. The holding government is also obligated to
notify, without delay, all states concerned so that they might
proceed to establish jurisdiction for purposes of extradition. 9
Yet, unlike other active U.N. counter-terrorism conventions,
the Hostages Convention also sets out specific reasons for which
extradition might be refused. An extradition request can be
denied by a state if that government has "substantial grounds" for
believing that the request has been made by another government
"for the purposes of prosecuting or punishing a person on account
of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political
opinion."'0 Such criteria are normally reserved for persons seeking
asylum as refugees in a foreign state. Nonetheless, insertion of this
language into the convention gives considerable discretion to the
holding state in determining whether to extradite an accused
offender. The refusal to extradite must be supplemented with the
possibility of prosecution by the holding state. This convention
similarly imposes on states the obligation to go forward with
prosecution proceedings against alleged offenders if extradition
does not occur. As provided for in Article 8, the state in whose
territory an alleged offender is found must, "without exception
whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
69. Hostages Convention, supra note 64, art. 9.
70. Id. art. 9(1).
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territory," submit the case for prosecution by its competent
authorities "through proceedings in accordance with law of that
State."71 Perpetrators will not, therefore, be able to evade
prosecution and punishment without the holding government's
investigation of those options.
C. Crimes Against the Safety of International Maritime Navigation
1. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of International Maritime Navigation
Over the last two decades, terrorist threats to maritime
security became a serious international concern. Accordingly, the
United Nations adopted two special legal instruments dealing with
crimes affecting the safety of international maritime navigation.
On October 7, 1985, five Palestinian gunmen seized the Italian-
flagged Achille Lauro cruise ship while it was sailing off the shore
of Egypt. During the episode, the perpetrators deliberately
murdered a wheelchair-bound American passenger. This horrific
act, erroneously branded an act of piracy in the international
media, was in fact a crime distinct in international law. It served
as the catalyst for the International Maritime Organization's
(IMO) sponsorship of a special legal instrument, the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
International Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention)7 3 to
address such unlawful terrorist acts against ocean vessels.74 The
1988 SUA Convention applies to all ships navigating through
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single state,
the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent states, or when
the alleged offender is found in the territory of a state. The
jurisdictional provisions are clear-cut. A contracting party may
directly establish jurisdiction over these offenses if it is the flag
71. Id. art 8.
72. For discussion, see Christopher C. Joyner, The 1988 IMO Convention on the
Safety of Maritime Navigation: Towards a Legal Remedy for Terrorism at Sea, [1989] 31
F.R.G. YB INT'L L. 230; Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille
Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (1988).
73. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
International Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. No. 101-1, 1678
U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter 1988 SUA Convention]. On
January 1, 2003, seventy-eight states were parties and fifty-eight were signatories to this
IMO Convention.
74. See Halberstam, supra note 72, at 270.
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state, if an offense occurs within its territorial sea, or if one of its
own nationals commits an offense.75 Under this Convention, a
person commits an offense when he "unlawfully and intentionally"
seizes control over a ship by force, performs an act of violence
against a persons on board the ship that is likely to endanger the
safe navigation of that vessel, destroys or causes damages to a ship
that endangers the safe navigation of that vessel, places a device
on board that ship that is likely to destroy or cause damage to that
vessel, destroys or damages maritime navigational facilities that
might endanger the safe navigation of a ship, knowingly
communicates false information endangering the safe navigation
of ships; or commits injury to or murder of any person in
connection with any of the preceding acts.76
To ensure prosecution and punishment, the offenses in this
Convention are deemed extraditable acts. To facilitate that
process, jurisdictional factors assume salient consideration. States
have obligations to establish their jurisdiction over the offenses
described, make the offenses punishable by appropriate
78penalties, take alleged offenders into custody, prosecute or
extradite alleged offenders,g° cooperate in preventative measures,"
and exchange information and evidence needed in related criminal1 2
proceedings. To accomplish these ends, the Convention
establishes two types of formal jurisdiction-obligatory and
discretionary. Article 6 provides that each party "shall take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction" when
the offense is committed "against or on board a ship flying the flag
of the State at the time the offence is committed; or (b) in the
territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or (c) by a
national of that State., 83 This provision goes on to assert that a
state party may also establish jurisdiction over any offense when
"(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence
is in that State; (b) during its commission a national of that State is
75. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 73, art. 6.
76. Id. art. 3(1).
77. Id. art. 6.
78. Id. art. 5.
79. Id. art. 7.
80. Id. art. 10.
81. Id. art. 13.
82. Id. art. 15.
83. Id. art. 6(1).
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seized, threatened, injured or killed; or (c) it is committed in an
attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any
act."8
2. Similarities and Differences
Article 11 of the 1988 SUA Convention provides for the
extradition of offenders in language that essentially replicates
Article 8 of the 1970 Hague Convention."' The offenses in
question are deemed extraditable in cases where extradition
treaties are concluded between parties.86 If no treaty is available,the Convention may serve as the legal basis for the extradition of
84. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 73, art. 6(2).
85. See Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. (8). In full, article 11 of the IMO
Convention provides that:
1. The offences set forth in article 3 shall be deemed to be included as
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States
Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable
offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a
treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it
has no extradition treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider
this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth
in article 3. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the
law of the requested State Party.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 3 as extraditable offences
between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 3 shall be treated, for the
purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed
not only in the place in which they occurred but also in a place within the
jurisdiction of the State Party requesting extradition.
5. A State Party which receives more than one request for extradition from
States which have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 7 and which
decides not to prosecute shall, in selecting the State to which the offender or
alleged offender is to be extradited, pay due regard to the interests and
responsibilities of the State Party whose flag the ship was flying at the time of
the commission of the offence.
6. In considering a request for the extradition of an alleged offender pursuant
to this Convention, the requested State shall pay due regard to whether his
rights as set forth in article 7, paragraph 3, can be effected in the requesting
State.
7. With respect to the offences as defined in this Convention, the provisions of
all extradition treaties and arrangements applicable between States Parties are
modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with
this Convention.
1988 SUA Convention, supra note 73, art. 11.
86. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 73, art.11(1).
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alleged offenders.87  Finally, for purposes of extradition, the
pertinent offenses may be treated as if they were committed within
the jurisdiction of a requesting state."' The 1998 Convention's
extradition article, however, elaborates three additional points
beyond those included in The Hague and Montreal Conventions. 9
First, a state, which receives more than one request for extradition
from states having proper jurisdiction, and which decides not to
prosecute, is expected to "pay due regard" to the state whose flag
the vessel was flying when the offence was committed. 90 Second,
the requested state is expected to pay due regard to whether the
rights of an alleged offender can be protected in the requesting
state. 91 Finally, Article 11 aims to ensure that all extradition
treaties and arrangements are modified so that they are made
compatible with the provisions in the 1988 SUA Convention.92
Intimately associated with the 1988 SUA Convention is its
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf (IMO SUA
Protocol).93 The IMO SUA Protocol applies to the offenses
described in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation when they are
committed on a "fixed platform." This is defined as an artificial
island, installation, or structure permanently attached to the sea-
bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation of resources or
for other economic purposes.94 States assume obligations for
establishing their jurisdiction over the offences described, and to
make the offenses punishable by appropriate penalties, take
alleged offenders into custody, and either extradite or institute
procedures for prosecuting them. Not surprisingly, the extradition
87. Id. art. 11(2).
88. Id. art. 11(4).
89. See Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. 8; see also Montreal Convention, supra
note 49, art. 8.
90. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 73, art. 11(5).
91. Id. art. 11(6). An offender has two stipulated rights: (1) to communicate
"without delay" with his nearest appropriate state representative or, if he is a stateless
person, the state in the territory of which he has his habitual residence; and (2) to be
visited by a representative of that state. Id. art. 7(3).
92. Id. art. 11(7).
93. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-1
(entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter IMO SUA Protocol]. By January 2003, at
least seventy-one states were parties to the IMO SUA Protocol.
94. Id. art. 1(3).
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and submission-of-cases-for-prosecution procedures are taken
verbatim from the 1988 IMO Convention.
In 2003, international concern remains acute over the
possibility of terrorism at sea. The scenarios producing great
anxiety today include ramming speedboats loaded with high
explosives into luxury cruise ships or terrorists commandeering a
freighter carrying dangerous chemicals or liquefied natural gas and
crashing it into an urban area port.9 While the IMO SUA
Convention would clearly apply to offenders who might commit
such activities, the critical objectives for governments should
include proactive policy, rather than legal response. That is,
governments must provide viable national means to prevent, deter
and apprehend would-be offenders before these violent crimes are
committed.
D. Crimes Associated with Violent Terrorist Activities
Four special U.N. conventions have been negotiated to deal
with particular activities associated with destructive terror
violence. The first of these was negotiated under the auspices of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent
international smuggling of nuclear materials. In the post-Cold
War world, serious concern arose over the possibility that nuclear
material might be smuggled from Russia, or other nuclear states,
into the hands of potential nuclear weapons states, or even
terrorist organizations.
1. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
Presently, the international legal system has few institutional
defenses against such activities, with the most salient being the
1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(PPNM Convention). 96 Significantly, the Physical Protection
Convention functions mainly as an anti-terrorism agreement, not a
nonproliferation measure. Accordingly, it presents two objectives.
First, the convention aims to establish levels of physical protection
needed for the safe international transportation of nuclear
95. See John Mintz, 15 Freighters Believed to Be Linked to Al Qaeda, WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 2002, at Al.
96. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,080 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1987) [hereinafter PPNM Convention]. In January
2003, there are at least eighty-one parties and forty-five signatories to this convention.
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material used for peaceful purposes. Second, it provides for
measures to be taken against unlawful acts that affect such nuclear
materials when they are being transported internationally, and
while stored and transported domestically.
The application of physical protection prescribed in the
convention applies only to nuclear material used for peaceful
purposes while in international transport.7 Other provisions (e.g.,
requirements that relate to making specified acts punishable
offences under national law, establishing jurisdiction over those
offenses and providing for the prosecution or extradition of
alleged offenders) pertain also to nuclear material used for
peaceful purposes while used, stored, or transported
domestically. Accordingly, states parties to the PPNM
Convention are obliged to punish, under their national law, the
offenses pertaining to nuclear material in the Convention.99 In
particular, such offenses include intentional commission of
unlawful unauthorized acts dealing with nuclear material that may
cause or threaten death, serious injury, or damage to any person
or property; the theft of nuclear material; embezzlement or
fraudulent attainment of nuclear material; demands made through
intimidation for nuclear material; threats to use nuclear material to
cause death, serious injury, or damage to any person or property;
or threats to steal nuclear material in order to compel a person,
international organization, or government to do or refrain from
doing any act."'O Most importantly for this study, the convention
prescribes specific rules for jurisdiction over, and extradition of,
alleged offenders. Article 9 sets out the obligation for states to
detain offenders for the purposes of extradition or prosecution,""
while Article 10 articulates the duty of the holding government
either to extradite or alternatively, to prosecute an accused
offender.' °2 The duty to extradite is then elaborated in Article 11,
97. Id. art. 2(1).
98. Id. art. 2(2).
99. Id. art. 3.
100. Id. art 7(1).
101. Id. art. 9.
102. Id. art. 10. Article 10 substantially repeats the "extradite-or-prosecute" language
in Article 7 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft. Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. 7.
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in language nearly verbatim to that in previous U.N. counter-
terrorism conventions. 13
Once again, extradition emerges as the critical legal
ingredient underpinning the international enforcement process.
The legal obligations are clear and the procedures are familiar.
Under the doctrine of state responsibility, each state must ensure
that these processes function efficiently.
2. The Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives
The second instrument, the Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic Explosives
Convention), 104 was sponsored by ICAO in 1991 to suppress the
use of unmarked plastic explosives for bombing aircraft in flight.
The Convention requires each state party to prohibit and prevent
the manufacture in its territory of unmarked plastic explosives.
Plastic explosives must be marked during the manufacturing
process by special detection agents that are defined in the
Technical Annex to the convention. This Convention also requires
each state to prohibit and prevent the movement into or out of its
territory of unmarked plastic explosives and to exercise strict and
effective control over the possession of any existing stocks of
unmarked explosives. Stocks of plastic explosives not held by
military or police authorities must be destroyed or used for
peaceful purposes consistent with the objectives of the convention.
These stocks must be marked or rendered permanently ineffective
within three years from the convention's entry into force for each
state. The Convention also establishes an International Explosives
Technical Commission comprised of experts in the manufacture,
detection and research of explosives. The Commission is supposed
to evaluate technical developments relating to the manufacture,
marking and detection of explosives. It then reports its findings
through the Council of ICAO to all states and international
103. PPNM Convention, supra note 96, art. 11. This substantially repeats the language
contained in Article 8 of the 1970 Hague Convention, Article 8 of the Montreal
Convention, and Article 10 of the Hostages Convention. Hague Convention, supra note
43, art. 8; Montreal Convention, supra note 49, art. 8; Hostages Convention, supra note 64,
art. 10.
104. Final Act of the Conference on Air Law and Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives for the purpose of Detection, ICAO Doc. 9,571 (June 21, 1998). At
least eighty-eight states are party to this instrument in January 2003.
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organizations concerned, and if necessary, proposes amendments
to the Technical Annex to the Convention.
Unlike other post-1970 U.N. counter-terrorism instruments,
the Plastics Explosives Convention omits provisions for extradition
or prosecution of offenders. The focus of this instrument is not on
the prosecution and punishment of persons who use these plastic
explosives. Rather, the Convention aims at imposing obligations
for strict authoritative control and destruction of such explosives in
states. Consequently, no specific mention is made within the
convention for extradition, prosecution, or means of direct
interstate enforcement of provisions.
3. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings
A third violent activity intimately associated with terrorism is
the act of bombing public buildings and private property. To
suppress this violent activity, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings in 1997 (Terrorist Bombing Convention)."' This
instrument is modeled on the structure of previous
counterterrorism conventions adopted at the United Nations and
its specialized agencies. Like its predecessors, the Terrorist
Combing Convention does not attempt to define "terrorism."
Instead, the instrument defines particular behavior that,
irrespective of motivation, is condemned internationally as an
offense and is therefore made an appropriate subject of
international law enforcement cooperation. Under the
Convention, an offense is committed when any person engages in
the intentional and unlawful delivery, placement, discharge or
detonation of "an explosive or other lethal device in ... a place of
public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation
system or an infrastructure facility. ... " The Convention
105. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, S. TREATY
DOC. No. 106-6 (1997) (entered into force May 23, 2001) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing
Convention]. In January 2003, seventy-seven states were parties and fifty-eight states were
signatories to this convention. The United States initiated negotiation of this convention in
the aftermath of the 1996 deadly truck bombing attack on U.S. military personnel at the
Khubar Towers housing facility in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen American citizens
were killed and some 500 other persons were wounded. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB.
No. 10,433, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1996, at 21, 35 (1997).
106. Id. art. 2(1).
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underscores the pernicious intention of such bombings as a crime,
namely to cause death, serious bodily injury, or extensive
destruction that may result in major economic loss. Any person
also commits an offense under the Convention if he participates as
an accomplice in any of these acts, organizes others to commit
them, or in any other way contributes to their commission.' 7 The
Convention does not apply, however, where such an act does not
involve any international elements as defined by the convention.
States are obliged to establish jurisdiction over, and make
punishable under their domestic laws, the offenses specified in the
convention. Governments are also required to extradite or submit
for prosecution persons accused of committing or aiding in the
commission of the offenses. 10 8 In addition, states are obligated to
assist each other with criminal proceedings under the Convention.
To this end, Article 9 stipulates that the offenses in the convention
are deemed to be extraditable offenses between states under
existing extradition treaties, and under the Convention itself.
Further, should states have no extradition treaty with one another,
the Convention may serve as the legal basis for extradition.
Finally, the Convention declares that universal jurisdiction may be
used by states as a lawful conduit for extradition. 1°9
107. Id. arts. 2(2) & 2(3).
108. Article 8 provides in full that:
1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall,
in cases to which article 6 applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in
its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws
of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as
in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.
2. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or
otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person
will be returned to that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the
trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the person was
sought, and this State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree
with this option and other terms they may deem appropriate, such a conditional
extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in
paragraph 1.
Id. art. 8.
109. In full, the Terrorist Bombing Convention makes extradition possible under the
following circumstances:
1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States
Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. States Parties undertake
2003] International Extradition and Global Terrorism 529
In contrast to previous U.N. counter-terrorism instruments,
the Terrorist Bombing Convention explicitly recognizes the
problematic nature of the political offenses exception.
Accordingly, Article 11 rejects the political offenses exception as it
tersely avers that:
None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded,
for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a
political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence
or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a
request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such
an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns
a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence
or an offence inspired by political motives."0
This stipulation aims to contribute to legally differentiating
terror violence from other violent activities of national liberation
movements. In the past, the political offense conundrum generated
not only considerable legal polemics to defining terrorism as a
crime, but also formidable political encumbrances to exercising the
extradition between governments. To a certain degree, the
provision succeeds in that ambition. But at the same time the
convention contains a caveat that governments could use to refuse
to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be
subsequently concluded between them.
2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it
has no extradition treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider
this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth
in article 2. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the
law of the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 2 as extraditable offences
between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for the
purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed
not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States
that have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 6, paragraphs 1 and
2.
5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements between States
Parties with regard to offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be
modified as between State Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with
this Convention.
Id. art 9. Compare Hague Convention, supra note 42, art. 8; Montreal Convention, supra
note 49, art. 8; IMO SUA Convention, supra note 93, art. 11.
110. Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 105, art. 11.
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extradition of alleged offenders to another state. Like the
Hostages Convention, the Terrorist Bombing Convention asserts
that no government is obligated to extradite if it has "substantial
grounds" to believe that an extradition request is being made "for
the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of
that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political
opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice
to that person's position for any of these reasons. 1.. Such
conditions normally are reserved for governments to consider in
grants of political asylum to persons seeking refugee status. '
While this provision preserves that protection for refugees, it
seems critical that governments must not abuse these conditions as
loopholes or rationales to protect terrorist offenders.
4. The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism
The final U.N. counter-terrorism convention strives to curtail
financial support for terrorist activities. The international
community has demonstrated serious concern for the transnational
financing of terrorist activities that kill innocent people and
destroy civilian property. It is well known that the international
terror network is financed by a complex web of wealthy donors,
money launderers, and cross-border currency transfers. Hence,
elimination of sources of funding is tantamount to suppressing
terrorist activities. To facilitate this objective, the General
Assembly adopted the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999 (Terrorism
Financing Convention). ' 3 This Convention provides for a legal
regime prohibiting certain unlawful activities by individuals or
groups that are ancillary to terrorist acts.
The Convention defines an offense as the direct involvement
or complicity in the intentional and unlawful provision or
collection of funds with the intention or knowledge that any part
of the funds may be used to perpetrate: (1) any of the offenses
described in the eleven U.N. conventions enumerated in the
111. Id. art. 12.
112. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951 (entered into
force Apr. 22, 1954) 189 U.N.T.S. 137, at art. 1 (definition of refugee).
113. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, SEN.
TREATY DOC. No. 106-49 (Dec. 9, 1999) (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002) [hereinafter
Terrorism Financing Convention].
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Annex; or (2) an act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to any person not actively involved in armed conflict in
order to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.
14
The provision or collection of funds in this manner is an offense,
irrespective of whether the funds are actually used to carry out the
proscribed acts. Each state is required to take appropriate
measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the
detection and freezing, seizure or forfeiture of any funds used or
allocated for committing the offenses described. The offenses
referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable
offenses."' Accordingly, states are mandated to establish their
jurisdiction over these offenses, take alleged offenders into
custody, prosecute or extradite alleged offenders," 6 cooperate in
preventive measures and countermeasures, and exchange
information and evidence needed in related criminal proceedings.
Of significance here is that states parties are obligated to offer
each other "the greatest measures of assistance" in conducting
criminal investigations and extradition proceedings. The
convention unequivocally asserts that states parties "may not
refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the ground of bank
secrecy.'.7 Through this stipulation, governments are obliged to
be more forthcoming in their transactions.
Extradition is central to enforcing the Terrorism Financing
Convention. The offenses defined in the Convention are deemed
to be extraditable between states parties under existing extradition
treaties, future extradition treaties, and even in the absence of
treaties. This Convention, like earlier U.N. counter-terrorism
114. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
115. Id. art. 11.
116. The "extradite or prosecute rule" contained in Article 10 provides in relevant
part:
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall....
if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever
and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case
without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities
shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence
of a grave nature under the law of that State.
Id. art. 10. This language is virtually identical to the Article 8 "extradite or prosecute"
provision in the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. See
Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 105, art. 8.
117. Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 113, art. 12(2).
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instruments, may also serve as the legal basis for extradition
between states. Moreover, states may use this convention as the
legal rationale for exercising universal jurisdiction against an
alleged offender. "' Using verbatim language in the 1997 Terrorist
Bombing Convention, the Terrorism Financing Convention also
forbids resorting to political offenses as the only reason for
refusing a government's request for extradition or mutual legal
assistance." It provides that:
None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded for
the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political
offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an
offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for
extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence
may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political
offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an
offence inspired by political motives.
While the events of September 11 clearly highlight the value
and critical nature of denying financial assets to terrorists-and
hence the direct relevance of this convention-it remains obvious
that the government of each state must take action to cut off funds
to these groups. The criminal offense of financing terrorism has
been established and the legal rules are clear; however, taking
action to implement the means for denying those funds and
punishing offenders remain the responsibility of individual
governments.
IV. THE COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON TERRORISM
The U.N.'s most recent initiative against terrorist activities is
a comprehensive draft convention on international terrorism. The
text for such an instrument was first proposed by India in 1996,120
but it was not until 1999 that the General Assembly entrusted its
Ad Hoc Committee to further develop a convention (Draft Anti-
Terrorism Convention). Those negotiations, which began in 2000
in the Working Group of the Sixth Committee, have progressively
continued. The substantive content for the Convention is nearly
118. Id. art. 11.
119. Id. art. 14.
120. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 151, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/51/6 (1996).
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complete,' although the Working Group encountered serious
difficulties in reconciling three important issues in the text: (1) the
definition of terrorism;"' (2) the relationship of the comprehensive
convention to existing and future counter-terrorism treaties; and
(3) the differentiation between terrorism and the right of peoples
to self determination and to combat foreign occupation. Although
these issues remain both politically troublesome and legally
unresolved, this draft Convention to suppress international
terrorism relies on extradition as a critical tool for law
enforcement.
To a considerable degree, the Draft Anti-Terrorism
Convention is a combination of provisions from earlier U.N.
conventions. Of the twenty-seven proposed articles in the Draft
Anti-Terrorism Convention's text (the final five of which are
procedural clauses), fifteen directly relate to extradition or
jurisdictional considerations for exercising that process.'23 The
Convention will not apply to situations where the offense is
committed entirely within a state, the perpetrators and victims are
nationals of that state, and the government of that state has the
alleged offenders in custody. 24 Moreover, criminal acts committed
within the scope of the Convention cannot be justified by political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or similar
121. The text of the draft convention is in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. See
G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Annex 1, Supp. No. 37, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/57/37
(1993).
122. The draft text does not include a definition for "terrorism" among the terms
articulated in Article 1. Yet, the "informal text" of Article 2 defines terrorist activities as
"an offence within the meaning of this Convention" if a person causes "by any means,
unlawfully and intentionally,"
(a) Death or seriously bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use,
a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure
facility or the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph
1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the
purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or
to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from
doing any act.
Id. at 6. The threat or attempt to commit such acts constitutes an offense as well. The text
for the alternative Article 2 provision simply reads: "Where this Convention and a treaty
dealing with a specific category of terrorist offence would be applicable in relation to the
same act as between States that are parties to both treaties, the provisions of the latter
shall prevail." Id. at 7.
123. Viz., articles 3-17.
124. G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 121, art. 3.
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considerations.12 For purposes of prosecution or extradition, this
Convention's jurisdictional scope over the offenses is broader than
any other U.N. counter-terrorism instrument. States may establish
jurisdiction on at least nine legal grounds: (1) if the offense is
committed in that state; (2) on board a vessel flying the flag of that
state; (3) by a national of that state; or (4) by a stateless person
who lives in that state. In addition, jurisdiction may be established:
(5) if an offense is committed outside the territory of a state, but
its intended effects are to intimidate or influence that government;
(6) if an offense is committed against a national of that state; (7) if
the offense is committed against a state's government-owned
facility or diplomatic mission; (8) if the offense is committed to
compel a state to do or abstain from doing something; or (9) if the
offense occurs on board an aircraft operated by the government of
that state.
1 26
The Convention contains safeguards to prevent offenders
from evading apprehension. States are obligated to ensure that
refugee status with asylum is not granted to possible terrorist
offenders. 127  They must also prevent their territory from being
used for terrorist training camps or other terrorist activities. 28 One
of the convention's more intriguing provisions asserts that if a
member of a legal entity within a state commits a terrorist offense,
that legal entity will be held criminally, civilly or administratively
liable for the act.'
29
A. Article 10
Article 10 initiates the Draft Anti-Terrorism Convention's
extradition procedures. Parties are obligated to investigate and
apprehend alleged offenders. Accused offenders are afforded
rights to communicate with the "nearest appropriate
Representative" of the state of which they are a national, as well as
to be visited by that representative. A state is also directed to
notify the Secretary General of the United Nations that it has
taken a person into custody. 3 ° Article 11 reaffirms for states
parties the extradite-or-prosecute principle, in language virtually
125. Id. art. 5.
126. Id. arts. 6 (1) & (2).
127. Id. art 7.
128. Id. art 8.
129. Id. art. 9.
130. Id. art. 10.
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identical to similar provisions in earlier U.N. counter-terrorism.. 131
conventions. Significantly, the Draft Anti-Terrorism Convention
contains an explicit prohibition on the use of the political offense
exclusion as the "sole ground" for denying a request for
extradition or mutual legal assistance.1 ' That proscription,
however, is subsequently qualified by a mandate stating that no
obligation exists for a requested state to extradite "if it has
substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition
for offences... has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion,
nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance
with the request would cause prejudice to that person's position
for any of these reasons."'33 Such preemptive protections are
welcome, yet the highly subjective nature of this exclusionary
clause might make it possible for governments to deny the
extradition of alleged offenders to other states on evidence that is
merely interpretative, which could obfuscate bringing offenders to
justice.
B. Article 17
Article 17, the core extradition provision, draws its language
from obligations in similar provisions in earlier counter-terrorism
instruments:
1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be
included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty
existing between any of the States Parties before the entry into
force of the Convention. States Parties undertake to include
such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition
treaty to be subsequently concluded between them.
2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the
requested State may, at its option, consider this Convention as a
legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in
article 2. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions
provided by the law of the requested State Party.
131. See, e.g., Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 105, art. 9.
132. G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 121, art. 14.
133. Id. art. 15; see also Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 105, art. 12.
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3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on
the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences referred to
in article 2 as extraditable offences between themselves, subject
to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated,
for the purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they
had been committed not only in the place in which they
occurred but also the territory of the States that have
established jurisdiction in accordance with article 6, paragraphs
1 and 2.
5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements
between States Parties with regard to offences set forth in
article 2 shall be deemed to be modified as between States
Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with thisConvention.' 34
In sum, the offenses in the convention are deemed to be
extraditable offenses under existing extradition treaties and under
future treaties. Should states lack extradition agreements with
each other, the Convention may serve as the legal basis for
undertaking extradition between them. The Convention also
declares that universal jurisdiction may serve as a lawful
justification amongst parties for extradition.
C. Article 18
The third area of controversy in negotiating the Draft Anti-
Terrorism Convention pertains to exclusions from the scope of the
convention. In the Article 18 text circulated by the Coordinator of
the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee, the provision asserts
that, "[t]he activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as
those terms are understood by international humanitarian law,
which are governed by that law, are not governed by this
convention."' The critical consideration here is that military
forces engaged in armed conflict are governed by the laws of war
and international humanitarian law, as opposed to rules
prohibiting terrorist activities.
134. G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 121, art. 17; see e.g., IMO SUA Convention, supra
note 93, art. 11; Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 105, art. 9.
135. UN Doc. A/57/37 (Annex IV), at 17.
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The difficulty over this provision, however, hinges on a draft
provision proposed by the Islamic Conference that adds a
politically problematic caveat. The provision would provide that,
"[t]he activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in
situations of foreign occupation, as those terms are understood by
international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law,
are not governed by this convention."' 3 6 The phrase "situations of
foreign occupation" seems clearly directed at the situation of the
Palestinians on the West Bank. Consequently, if this caveat were
adopted, the resortby Palestinian extremists to committing violent
acts against Israelis, including homicide bombers who
indiscriminately target civilians, would not be regarded as unlawful
terrorist offenses under the Convention. Rather, these acts would
be converted into legitimate activities taken in the struggle for
Palestinian self-determination and national liberation from Israeli
occupation. Thus, any Palestinians who survived a violent attack,
or conspired to commit such destructive activities, would be
immune from extradition by states. It therefore remains clear that
no easy solution is likely to be found that resolves this dilemma to
the satisfaction of all. Hence, for the foreseeable future, the Draft
Anti-Terrorism Convention, with its considerable potential for
extraditing terrorist offenders, remains more a legal prospect than
a prospective set of legal rules.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The internationalization of law enforcement activities remains
a vital strategy for governments in combating global terrorism.
The key to this law enforcement process is having special
international instruments that designate certain acts as criminal
offenses and provide for the extradition of accused offenders to
states having jurisdiction over the offense for trial and prosecution.
Since 1963, the U.N. agencies have sponsored, adopted, and
promoted implementation of a combination of conventions that
criminalize certain terrorist acts as offenses under international
law and facilitate extradition or prosecution of the perpetrators.
The Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, as well as
ICAO, IMO and the IAEA, contributed immensely to this law-
making process. In this connection, governments now realize that
136. UN Doc. A/57/37 (Annex IV), at 17 (emphasis added).
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the fight against global terrorism necessitates a multifaceted
response that must incorporate improved law enforcement
procedures, including further widespread use of extradition.
Governments should be given wider legal scope for bringing
alleged terrorist perpetrators to trial, and extradition practice
should be reformed such that more restrictions are placed on using
the political offence exception. Accordingly, more effective
measures to promote international cooperation in the prevention
of terrorist violence and the prosecution of its perpetrators must
be developed at the international, regional and bilateral levels.
These U.N. conventions facilitate that process, especially by
criminalizing certain offenses and highlighting extradition as an
integral means for multilateral law enforcement.
The U.N. counter-terrorism instruments address the question
of extraditable offenses and proffer mandatory requirements for
extradition with few grounds for refusal to do so. Considered
collectively, they provide a wider basis for extradition
arrangements by eliminating the list-of-specific-offenses approach
in favor of a more generalized, indeed, universal jurisdictional
approach for extraditing terrorist offenders. Further, where no
bilateral treaty exists between states, extradition traditionally
could be premised upon the customary international law principles
of reciprocity and comity. The constellation of U.N. agreements
gives formal structure and direction for using the extradition
process over a broad multilateral jurisdictional scope. In addition,
these instruments aim to coordinate and enhance mutual
assistance among parties with the goal of combating serious
transnational terrorist crimes.
The most recent of these instruments seeks to impose limits
on the mandatory political offense exception by excluding terrorist
acts that are recognized in multilateral conventions as being
especially grave criminal offenses. Indeed, the political offense
exception is specifically declared not to be a bar to extradition for
crimes of terrorist violence. Yet, it is important to realize that a
government's decision to extradite is still subjective because
extradition can be denied if government officials believe the
prosecution of an accused offender might be motivated by that
person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political
opinion. The problem with such a prophylactic stipulation seems
plainly obvious. Persons might commit terrorist acts in violent
reaction to a government's policies that affect their racial,
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religious, ethnic, or national minority group in that state. This
situation therefore might qualify for a denial of extradition from
another government, even though the person sought was not
attempting to change the political system of the requesting state.
It is true that the series of U.N. counter-terrorism instruments
were negotiated piecemeal and do not create a fully integrated
anti-terrorist legal system. Still, these instruments establish a
framework for international cooperation among states that is
designed to prevent and suppress international terrorism. This is to
be accomplished by requiring states to cooperate in the prevention
and investigation of terrorist activities, to criminalize terrorist acts,
to assist other states in the prosecution of terrorists, and either to
extradite or to prosecute alleged offenders found in their territory.
The end goal is to ensure that accused terrorists are apprehended,
prosecuted, and punished. In this manner, the United Nations
may have instituted a patchwork quilt of international legal
commitments to stem terrorism. These conventions build on each
other as they incorporate the process of extradition among states
parties as the principal means for international enforcement.
At the heart of these anti-terrorism conventions is the
"extradite or prosecute" requirement. This principle imposes upon
each state the obligation either to extradite an offender to one of
the states that has jurisdiction under the convention, or to submit
the case to its authorities for prosecution. Since the Hague
Convention, this choice has been provided in every U.N.-
sponsored agreement that seeks multilateral cooperation in law
enforcement to suppress international acts of terrorism."'
It is clear that contemporary global terrorism involves
criminal acts usually perpetrated by nonstate actors. It is also
apparent that the appropriate response of a victim state in defense
against such acts is to seek the assistance of law enforcement.
Preeminent is the obligation of states party to U.N. counter-
terrorism instruments to extradite or prosecute. All nonstate
actors, however, operate within the sovereign territory of a state,
thus creating the potential for conflicts of legal jurisdiction. When
137. Indeed, given the persuasive importance of the principle of aut dedere autjudicare
for the enforcement of contemporary international criminal law, some highly respected
commentators have suggested that this obligation has today attained the level of a rule of
general international law. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M. Wise, AUT
DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995).
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a government is unwilling or unable to cooperate in the
suppression of such terrorism, or when it is covertly supporting
such terrorist activities, then law enforcement fails as an option.
The international legal authority for a government to respond
to acts of international terrorism remains dependent on other
international actors. States must rely on each other to combat
international terrorism effectively through means of extradition.
To strengthen international criminal law against terrorist activities,
states parties to an international agreement must be obligated to
prosecute an offender if the holding government decides against
extradition. The obligation to prosecute or extradite persons
accused of terrorist offenses underscores the pervasive recognition
that governments are duty-bound to act, either through
prosecution or extradition, to make certain that persons who
perpetrate injury or damage to the fundamental interests of the
international community are apprehended, prosecuted, and
brought to justice. Yet, the legal obligation for governments to
extradite or prosecute, while necessary, is not sufficient.
The force of legal obligation may motivate governments to
move toward enforcing legal rules that punish terrorists, but the
critical ingredient for that process is political will. Governments
must have the political resolve to fully implement obligations into
policy action and must be willing to make international extradition
law function as it is intended. International statesmen crafted and
implemented these U.N. instruments to outlaw various acts of
global terrorism and to facilitate means for punishing the
offenders. But if governmental officials are not willing to convert
these laws into actual practice, those legal obligations will be
nothing more than words on paper.
Legal obligations must be transformed into policy actions.
However, if the past is prologue, that recognition should give
pause for concern. States are not only legal entities, but also
political creatures. Their governments are overtly sensitive to
both domestic and international political pressures. In a world
earmarked by conflicting political, ideological, and economic
tensions at home and abroad, governments will have difficulty in
mobilizing the political will to make the international extradition
process work more effectively in apprehending and prosecuting
terrorist offenders. In the end, the critical challenge for
governments in this era of global terrorism will be to discover how
they can resolutely and consistently marshal the necessary political
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will to prosecute accused offenders, particularly their own
nationals, for their alleged terrorist offenses abroad.
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